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89 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
89 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
# `TPM2_MakeCredential()`
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`TPM2_MakeCredential()` and
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[`TPM2_ActivateCredential()`](TPM2_ActivateCredential.md) provide a
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mechanism by which an application can send secrets to a TPM-using
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application. This mechanism is asymmetric encryption/decryption with
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support for an authorization policy of the sender's choice.
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`TPM2_MakeCredential()` takes an a public key (typically the endorsement
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key's public key), the [cryptographic name of an
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object](/Intro/README.md#Cryptographic-Object-Naming) in a TPM
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identified by that the given public key, and a small secret called a
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`credential`, and it encrypts `{name, credential}` to the given public
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key.
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The object name input parameter, being a name, binds an optional
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authorization policy that
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[`TPM2_ActivateCredential()`](TPM2_ActivateCredential.md) will enforce.
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`TPM2_MakeCredential()` can be implemented entirely in software, as it
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uses no secret, TPM-resident key material. All the interesting
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semantics are on the
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[`TPM2_ActivateCredential()`](TPM2_ActivateCredential.md) side.
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Together with [`TPM2_Quote()`](TPM2_Quote.md) and
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[`TPM2_ActivateCredential()`](TPM2_ActivateCredential.md), this function
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can be used to implement attestation protocols.
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A typical use is to encrypt an AES key to an `EKpub`, then encrypt a
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large secret payload in the AES key, then sending the outputs of
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`TPM2_MakeCredential()` and the encrypted large secret payload. The
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peer receives these items and calls
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[`TPM2_ActivateCredential()`](TPM2_ActivateCredential.md) to recover the
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AES key, then decrypts the large ciphertext payload to recover the large
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cleartext secret.
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> NOTE: The `objectName` input names a key object that must present on
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> the destination TPM, and the `objectName` is included in the plaintext
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> that is encrypted to the public key identified by `handle`, _but_ none
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> of the key material of `objectName` is used to key any cryptographic
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> operations in `TPM2_MakeCredential()`, and therefore neither is the
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> private area of `objectName` on the destination TPM used in any
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> cryptographic operations in
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> [`TPM2_ActivateCredential()`](TPM2_ActivateCredential.md).
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>
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> This means that the key named by `objectName` can even be a
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> universally-well-known key. The only part of that key that truly
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> matters is the policy digest named in the public area of `objectName`.
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## Authorization
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[`TPM2_ActivateCredential()`](TPM2_ActivateCredential.md) checks the
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authorization of the caller to perform this operation by enforcing the
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sender's policy named by the sender's `objectName`. See
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[here](TPM2_ActivateCredential.md) for details.
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Some possible authorization policies to enforce include:
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- that some non-resettable PCR has not been extended since boot
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This allows the recipient to extend that PCR immediately after
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activating the credential to prevent the attestation protocol from
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being used again without rebooting.
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- user authentication / attended boot
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The policy could require physical presence, authentication of a user
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with biometrics and/or a smartcard and/or a password.
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- locality
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## Inputs
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- `TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle` (public key to encrypt to, typically a remote TPM's EKpub)
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- `TPM2B_DIGEST credential` (not necessarily a digest, but a small [digest-sized] secret)
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- `TPM2B_NAME objectName` (name of object resident on the same TPM as `handle` that `TPM2_ActivateCredential()` will check)
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## Outputs
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- `TPM2B_ID_OBJECT credentialBlob` (ciphertext of encryption of `credential` with a secret "seed" [see below])
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- `TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET secret` (ciphertext of encryption of a "seed" to `handle`)
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## References
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- [TCG TPM Library part 1: Architecture, section 24](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf)
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- [TCG TPM Library part 2: Structures](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part2_Structures_pub.pdf)
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- [TCG TPM Library part 3: Commands, section 13](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part3_Commands_pub.pdf)
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- [TCG TPM Library part 3: Commands Code, section 13](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part3_Commands_code_pub.pdf)
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