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| title | date | replyURI | replyTitle | replyType | replyAuthor | replyAuthorURI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Route authorization and TLS | 2022-10-29T23:24:50-07:00 | https://community.mojeek.com/t/bgp-hijacking/400 | BGP Hijacking | DiscussionForumPosting | Mike | https://community.mojeek.com/u/mike/ |
Assuming we have transit encryption, the main result of Border Gateway Patrol (BGP) errors is mass downtime. Downtime for a typical service is a headache; downtime for a CA can be disastrous. BGP hijacking also enables certificate mis-issuance by messing with weak domain control validation. Route authorization is an important mitigation!
That said: TLS is our last line of defense against BGP attacks that re-direct HTTPS requests.
Users wouldn't have been robbed if Celer Bridge used HSTS preloading. Victims were greeted by a TLS error and chose to add a security exception; a payment platform shouldn't offer that choice. HSTS instructs browsers to remove this option, and HSTS preloading prevents HSTS stripping (and TLS stripping).
HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) makes such attacks even harder, but HPKP had its own list of issues preventing adoption.