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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Firefox's multi-process architecture was overhauled, starting with a [utility pr
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They've rolled out a separate GPU process on some platforms; the roll-out will likely finish this year.
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They've rolled out a separate GPU process on some platforms; the roll-out will likely finish this year.
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Regarding toolchain hardening: Chromium official builds use [Clang's CFI sanitizer](https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html); Firefox doesn't. However, a subset of Firefox's libraries support [RLBox sandboxing](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/12/webassembly-and-back-again-fine-grained-sandboxing-in-firefox-95/). This isn't a complete solution, but is still a welcome change. [The Tor Browser disables libgraphite on the "safer" security level](https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/tree/modules/security-prefs.js?id=c8f7cd3fec5d5845179fcf71ad46888f2d14c8b0) due to security concerns which RLBox may have addressed.
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Regarding toolchain hardening: Chromium official builds use [Clang's CFI sanitizer](https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html); Firefox doesn't. However, a subset of Firefox's libraries support [RLBox sandboxing](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/12/webassembly-and-back-again-fine-grained-sandboxing-in-firefox-95/). This isn't a complete solution, but is still a welcome change. [The Tor Browser disables libgraphite on the "safer" security level](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/tree/browser/components/securitylevel/SecurityLevel.jsm?id=ffdf16f3e8a44b306abd988be874a184b7de1cc6#n273) due to security concerns which RLBox may have addressed.
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I'm looking forward to seeing [PID namespace isolation](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1151624) at some point.
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I'm looking forward to seeing [PID namespace isolation](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1151624) at some point.
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17
content/notes/intentional-telemetry.md
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content/notes/intentional-telemetry.md
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---
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title: "Intentional telemetry"
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date: 2022-09-26T22:41:33-07:00
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replyURI: "https://dizl.de/@maze/109066602774324727"
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replyTitle: "Well, what else do you need an analytics tool for than to find new insights?"
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replyType: "SocialMediaPosting"
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replyAuthor: "@maze@dizl.de"
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replyAuthorURI: "https://dizl.de/@maze"
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---
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Compare the two scenarios:
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Scenario A: "We received a piece of user feedback to change this design to avoid errors; their suggestion was well received by other users. Let's collect some telemetry from that component to see is these issues are representative of the larger population; based on that, we'll know whether it warrants a re-design of that component."
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Scenario B: "Telemetry says users never use this feature; we can remove it."
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In Scenario B, telemetry prompted a decision; in Scenario A, telemetry helped understand a real specific problem. Telemetry should be used to clarify an existing insight rather than make discoveries on its own. Metrics should not be collected lightly; they should be collected with intention (and, of course, prior informed consent).
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@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ That microblog entry was a response to another article from which this article b
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6. Torbutton aims to allow many Tor Browser users to share the same configuration.
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6. Torbutton aims to allow many Tor Browser users to share the same configuration.
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=> https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ Tor security settings
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=> https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ Tor security settings
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=> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/tree/modules/security-prefs.js The preferences impacted by those security settings
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=> https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/tree/browser/components/securitylevel/SecurityLevel.jsm?id=ffdf16f3e8a44b306abd988be874a184b7de1cc6#n273 The preferences impacted by those security settings
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7. Users of metered connections may need to block large elements. Users with accessibility needs may need to alter inaccessible pages. Users who don’t speak a page’s language may need to use machine translation.[8] Telling users to just “stop doing this” would be arrogant, yet all three of these examples are fingerprintable.
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7. Users of metered connections may need to block large elements. Users with accessibility needs may need to alter inaccessible pages. Users who don’t speak a page’s language may need to use machine translation.[8] Telling users to just “stop doing this” would be arrogant, yet all three of these examples are fingerprintable.
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@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ This article is an expansion of the ideas I presented in the microblog entry {{<
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We could reduce the number of combinations by combining all the filter lists into a single list that gets updated all at once. When <var>N</var>=1, we're at just <var>V</var> possible combinations. Updates could be spread out over a longer cadence, decreasing the value of <var>V</var>.
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We could reduce the number of combinations by combining all the filter lists into a single list that gets updated all at once. When <var>N</var>=1, we're at just <var>V</var> possible combinations. Updates could be spread out over a longer cadence, decreasing the value of <var>V</var>.
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[^6]: Torbutton aims to allow many Tor Browser users to share the same configuration. See its [security settings](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/) and [the preferences they change](https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/tree/modules/security-prefs.js).
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[^6]: Torbutton aims to allow many Tor Browser users to share the same configuration. See its [security settings](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/) and [the preferences they change](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/tree/browser/components/securitylevel/SecurityLevel.jsm?id=ffdf16f3e8a44b306abd988be874a184b7de1cc6#n273).
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[^7]: Users of metered connections may need to block large elements. Users with accessibility needs may need to alter inaccessible pages. Users who don't speak a page's language may need to use machine translation.[^8] Telling users to just "stop doing this" would be arrogant, yet all three of these examples are fingerprintable.
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[^7]: Users of metered connections may need to block large elements. Users with accessibility needs may need to alter inaccessible pages. Users who don't speak a page's language may need to use machine translation.[^8] Telling users to just "stop doing this" would be arrogant, yet all three of these examples are fingerprintable.
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@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ Tor users are encouraged to set the Tor Browser's (TBB) security settings to "sa
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=> https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/security-settings/ TBB Security Settings
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=> https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/security-settings/ TBB Security Settings
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This disables scripts, MathML, some fonts, SVG images, and other unsafe Firefox features:
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This disables scripts, MathML, some fonts, SVG images, and other unsafe Firefox features:
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=> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/tree/modules/security-prefs.js Torbutton security-prefs source code
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=> https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/tree/browser/components/securitylevel/SecurityLevel.jsm?id=ffdf16f3e8a44b306abd988be874a184b7de1cc6#n273 Tor Browser's source code for its security preferences
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If your site has any SVG images, the Tor browser will download these just like Firefox would (to avoid fingerprinting) but will not render them.
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If your site has any SVG images, the Tor browser will download these just like Firefox would (to avoid fingerprinting) but will not render them.
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@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ Many people use Tor out of necessity. On Tor, additional constraints apply.
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### Constraints of the Tor Browser
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### Constraints of the Tor Browser
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Tor users are encouraged to set the [Tor Browser's security settings](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/security-settings/) to "safest". This disables scripts, MathML, remote fonts, SVG images, and [other unsafe Firefox features](https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/tree/modules/security-prefs.js). If your site has any SVG images, the Tor browser will download these just like Firefox would (to avoid fingerprinting) but will not render them.
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Tor users are encouraged to set the [Tor Browser's security settings](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/security-settings/) to "safest". This disables scripts, MathML, remote fonts, SVG images, and [other unsafe Firefox features](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/tree/browser/components/securitylevel/SecurityLevel.jsm?id=ffdf16f3e8a44b306abd988be874a184b7de1cc6#n273). If your site has any SVG images, the Tor browser will download these just like Firefox would (to avoid fingerprinting) but will not render them.
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If you must use scripts, ensure that they perform well with just-in-time (<abbr title="Just-In-Time">JIT</abbr>) compilation disabled. The Tor Browser's "safer" mode, iOS Lockdown mode, and Microsoft Edge's "enhanced" security mode all disable JIT compilation by default.[^15]
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If you must use scripts, ensure that they perform well with just-in-time (<abbr title="Just-In-Time">JIT</abbr>) compilation disabled. The Tor Browser's "safer" mode, iOS Lockdown mode, and Microsoft Edge's "enhanced" security mode all disable JIT compilation by default.[^15]
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