tpm.dev.tutorials/Attestation

What Attestation is

An enrolled device can use a TPM to demonstrate:

• possession of a valid TPM

• it being in a trusted state by dint of having executed trusted code to get to that state

• possession of objects such as asymmetric keypairs being resident on the TPM (objects that might be used in the attestation protocol)

Possible outputs of succesful attestation:

• authorize client to join its network

• delivery of configuration metadata to the client

• unlocking of storage / filesystems on the client

• delivery of various secrets, such credentials for various authentication systems:

  • issuance of X.509 certificate(s) for TPM-resident attestaion public keys

    For servers these certificates would have dNSName subject alternative names (SANs).

    For a user device such a certificate might have a subject name and/or SANs identifying the user or device.

  • issuance of non-PKIX certificates (e.g., OpenSSH-style certificates)

  • issuance of Kerberos host-based service principal long-term keys ("keytabs")

  • service account tokens

  • etc.

• client state tracking

• etc.

Possible outputs of unsuccessful attestation:

• alerting

• diagnostics (e.g., which PCR extensions in the PCR quote and eventlog are not recognized, which then might be used to determine what firmware / OS updates a client has installed, or that it has been compromised)

In this tutorial we'll focus on attestion of servers in an enterprise environment. However, the concepts described here are applicable to other environments, such as IoTs and personal devices, where the attestation database could be hosted on a user's personal devices for use in joining new devices to the user's set of devices, or for joining new IoTs to the user's SOHO network.

Attestation Protocols

Attestation is done by a client computer with a TPM interacting with an attestation service over a network. This requires a network protocol for attestation.

Intended Audience

Readers should have read the TPM introduction tutorial.

Enrollment

Enrollment is the process and protocol for onboarding devices into a network / organization. For example, adding an IoT to a home network, a server to a data center, a smartphone or tablet or laptop to a persons set of personal devices, etc.

Generally attestation protocols apply to enrolled devices. Enrollment protocols may be very similar to attestation protocols, or even actually be sub-protocols of attestation protocols. Enrollment protocols can also be separate from attestation altogether.

This tutorial mostly covers only attestation of/by enrolled devices. For more about enrollment see the tutorial specifically for enrollment.

Notation

• Encrypt_<name> == encryption with the named private or secret key (if symmetric, then this primitive is expected to provide authenticated encryption).
• Sign_<name> == digital signature with the named private key.
• MAC_<name> == message authentication code keyed with the named secret key.
• CSn == client-to-server message number n
• SCn == server-to-client message number n
• {stuff, more_stuff} == a sequence of data, a "struct"
• {"key":<value>,...} == JSON text
• TPM2_Foo(<args>) == outputs of calling some TPM 2.0 command with args arguments
• XK == <X> key, for some <X> purpose (the TPM-resident object and its private key)
  • EK == endorsement key (the TPM-resident object and its private key)
  • AK == attestation key (the TPM-resident object and its private key)
  • TK == transport key (the TPM-resident object and its private key)
  • WK == well-known key used only as a TPM2_ActivateCredential() activation object, not used for any actual encryption or signing
• XKpub == <X>'s public key, for some <X> purpose
  • EKpub == EK public key
  • AKpub == AK public key
  • TKpub == TK public key
  • WKpub == WK public key
• XKname == <X>'s cryptographic name, for some <X> purpose
  • EKname == EK's cryptographic name
  • AKname == AK's cryptographic name
  • WKname == WK's cryptographic name

Threat Models

Some threats that an attestation protocol and implementation may want to address:

• attestation client impersonation
• attestation server impersonation
• replay attacks
• unauthorized firmware and/or OS updates
• theft or compromise of of attestation servers
• theft of client devices or their local storage (e.g., disks, JBODs)
• theft of client devices by adversaries capable of decapping and reading the client's TPM's NVRAM

The attestation protocols we discuss will provide at least partial protection against impersonation of attestation clients: once a TPM's EKpub/EKcert are bound to the device in the attestation server's database, that TPM can only be used for that device and no others.

All the attestation protocols we discuss will provide protection against unauthorized firmware and/or OS updates via attestation of root of trust measurements (RTM).

The attestation protocols we discuss will provide protection against impersonation of attestation servers without necessarily authenticating the servers to the clients in traditional ways (e.g., using TLS server certificates). The role of the attestation server will be to deliver to clients secrets and credentials they need that can only be correct and legitimate if the server is authentic. As well, an attestation server may unlock network access for a client, something only an authentic server could do.

We will show how an attestation server can avoid storing any cleartext secrets.

Theft of running client devices cannot be fully protected against by an attestation protocol. The client must detect being taken from its normal environment and shutdown in such a way that no secrets are left in cleartext on any of its devices. Frequent attestations might be used to detect theft of a client, but other keepalive signalling options are possible.

Theft of non-running client devices can be protected against by having the client shutdown in such a way that no secrets are left in cleartext on any of its devices. Such client devices may be configured to need the help of an attestation server to recover the secrets it needs for normal operation.

Full protection against decapping of TPM chips is not possible, but protection against off-line use of secrets stolen from TPM chips is possible by requiring that the client be on-line and attest in order to obtain secrets that it needs to operate. This allows for revocation of stolen clients, which would result in attestation protocol failures.

Proof of Possession of TPM

Proof of possession of a valid TPM is performed by the attestation client sending its TPM's Endorsement Key (EK) certificate (if one is available, else the attestation service must recognize the EK public key) and then exchanging additional messages by which the client can prove its possession of the EK.

Proof of possession of an EK is complicated by the fact that EKs are generally decrypt-only (some TPMs also support signing EKs, but the TCG specifications only require decrypt-only EKs). The protocol has to have the attestation service send a challenge (or key) encrypted to the EKpub and then the attestation client demonstrate that it was able to decrypt that with the EK. However, this is not quite how attestation protocols work! Instead of plain asymmetric encryption the server will use TPM2_MakeCredential(), while the attestation client will use TPM2_ActivateCredential() instead of plain asymmetric decryption.

Trusted State Attestation

Trusted state is attested by sending a quote of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) and the eventlog describing the evolution of the system's state from power-up to the current state. The attestation service validates the digests used to extend the various PCRs, and perhaps the sequence in which they appear in the eventlog, typically by checking a list of known-trusted digests (these are, for example, checksums of firmware images).

Typically the attestation protocol will have the client generate a signing-only asymmetric public key pair known as the attestation key (AK) with which to sign the PCR quote and eventlog. Binding of the EKpub and AKpub will happen via TPM2_MakeCredential() / TPM2_ActivateCredential().

Note that the TPM2_Quote() function produces a signed message -- signed with a TPM-resident AK named by the caller (and to which they have access), which would be the AK used in the attestation protocol.

The output of TPM2_Quote() might be the only part of a client's messages to the attestation service that include a signature made with the AK, but integrity protection of everything else can be implied (e.g., the eventlog and PCR values are used to reconstruct the PCR digest signed in the quote). TPM2_Quote() signs more than just a digest of the selected PCRs. TPM2_Quote() signs all of:

• digest of selected PCRs
• caller-provided extra data (e.g., a cookie/nonce/timestamp/...),
• the TPM's firmware version number,
• clock (the TPM's time since startup),
• resetCount (an indirect indicator of reboots),
• restartCount (an indirect indicator of suspend/resume events)
• and safe (a boolean indicating whether the clock might have ever gone backwards).

Binding of Other Keys to EKpub

The semantics of TPM2_MakeCredential() / TPM2_ActivateCredential() make it possible to bind a TPM-resident object to the TPM's EKpub.

TPM2_MakeCredential() encrypts to the EKpub a small secret datum and the name (digest of public part) of the TPM-resident object being bound. The counter-part to this, TPM2_ActivateCredential(), will decrypt that and return the secret to the application IFF (if and only if) the caller has access to the named object.

Typically attestation protocols have the client send its EKpub, EKcert (if it has one), AKpub (the public key of an "attestation key"), and other things (e.g., PCR quote and eventlog signed with the AK), and the server will then send the output of TPM2_MakeCredential() that the client can recover a secret from using TPM2_ActivateCredential().

The implication is that if the client can extract the cleartext payload of TPM2_MakeCredential(), then it must possess a) the EK private key corresponding to the EKpub, b) the AK private key corresponding to the object named by the server.

Proof of possession can be completed immediately by demonstrating knowledge of the secret sent by the server. Proof of possession can also be delayed to an eventual use of that secret, allowing for single round trip attestation.

Binding hosts to TPMs

(TBD. Talk about IDevID or similar certificates binding hosts to their factory-installed TPMs, and how to obtain those from vendors.)

Attestation Protocol Patterns and Actual Protocols (decrypt-only EKs)

Note: all the protocols described below are based on decrypt-only TPM endorsement keys.

Let's start with few observations and security considerations:

• Clients need to know which PCRs to quote. E.g., the IBM sample attestation client and server has the client ask for a list of PCRs and then the client quotes just those.

  But clients could just quote all PCRs. It's more data to send, but probably not a big deal, and it saves a round trip if there's no need to ask what PCRs to send.

• Some replay protection or freshness indication for client requests is needed. A stateful method of doing this is to use a server-generated nonce (as an encrypted state cookie embedding a timestamp). A stateless method is to use a timestamp and reject requests with old timestamps.

  As well, one can use the resetCount from the quote to check if an attestation is the first after a reboot or not. Though this does require that the attestation server maintain some writable state (namely, the reset count.

• Replay protection of server to client responses is provided by using a different AK each time the client attests. This works because TPM2_MakeCredential() binds the AK such that TPM2_ActivateCredential() will not succeed unless the server used the same AKname as the name of the AK used by the client.

• Ultimately the protocol must make use of TPM2_MakeCredential() and TPM2_ActivateCredential() in order to authenticate a TPM-running host via its TPM's EKpub.

  The same is not true of TPM2_Quote() because one can build an attestation protocol that does not depend on signing quotes. Essentially one can simply send an unsigned reading of the client's TPM's PCRs and clock information and use an activation object with adminWithPolicy set and a policyDigest of a policy that uses the TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer() and TPM2_PolicyPCR() commands to enforce that the resetCount and the PCRs are as asserted in the protocol. The server can then construct the same policy to compute the name of the activation object for TPM2_MakeCredential(), knowing that TPM2_ActivateCredential() will enforce that policy.

• Privacy protection of client identifiers may be needed, in which case TLS may be desired. Alternatively, the client could encrypt a session key to a public of the attestation server using TPM2_MakeCredential(), and then use the session key to encrypt confidential parameters, thus building something of a TLS-like protocol.

• Even if a single round trip attestation protocol is adequate, a return routability check may be needed to avoid denial of service attacks. I.e., do not run a single round trip attestation protocol over UDP without first requiring the client to echo a nonce/cookie.

  Using TCP effectively provides a return routability check.

• Statelessness on the server side is highly desirable, as that should permit having multiple servers and each of a client's messages can go to different servers. Conversely, keeping state on the server across multiple round trips can cause resource exhaustion / denial of service attack considerations.

• Statelessness maps well onto HTTP / REST. Indeed, attestation protocol messages could all be idempotent and therefore map well onto HTTP GET requests but for the fact that all the things that may be have to be sent may not fit on a URI local part or URI query parameters (and GET has no request body), therefore HTTP POST is needed for its ability to send a request body.

Error Cases Not Shown

Note that error cases are not shown in the protocols described below.

Naturally, in case of error the attestation server will send a suitable error message back to the client. Providing integrity protection for error messages is tricky, as there will always be some kinds of errors for which integrity protection cannot be provided, but also, there is no natural key with which to sign errors. An actual attestation protocol specification may require that clients know a public key that the server can use to sign its errors with.

Databases, Log Sinks, and Dashboarding / Alerting Systems Not Shown

In order to simplify the protocol diagrams below, interactions with databases, log sinks, and alerting systems are not shown.

A typical attestation service will, however, have interactions with those components, some or all of which might even be remote:

• attestation database
• log sinks
• dashboarding / alerting

If an attestation service must be on the critical path for booting an entire datacenter, it may be desirable for the attestation service to be able to run with no remote dependencies, at least for some time. This means, for example, that the attestation database should be locally available and replicated/synchronized only during normal operation. It also means that there should be a local log sink that can be sent to upstream collectors during normal operation.

Single Round Trip Attestation Protocol Patterns

An attestation protocol need not complete proof-of-possession immediately if the successful outcome of the protocol has the client subsequently demonstrate possession to other services/peers. This is a matter of taste and policy. However, one may want to have cryptographically secure "client attested successfully" state on the server without delay, in which case two round trips are the minimum for an attestation protocol.

In the following example the client obtains a certificate (AKcert) for its AKpub, filesystem decryption keys, and possibly other things, and eventually it will use those items in ways that -by virtue of having thus been used- demonstrate that it possesses the EK used in the protocol:

  <client knows a priori what PCRs to quote, possibly all, saving a round trip>

  CS0:  [ID], EKpub, [EKcert], AKpub, PCRs, eventlog, timestamp,
        TPM2_Quote(AK, PCRs, extra_data)=Signed_AK({hash-of-PCRs, misc, extra_data})
  SC0:  {TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, AKpub, session_key),
         Encrypt_session_key({AKcert, filesystem_keys, etc.})}

  <extra_data includes timestamp>

  <subsequent client use of AK w/ AKcert, or of credentials made
   available by dint of being able to access filesystems unlocked by
   SC0, demonstrate that the client has attested successfully>

(ID might be, e.g., a hostname.)

(In this diagram we show the use of a TPM simulator on the server side for implementing TPM2_MakeCredential().)

The server will validate that the timestamp is near the current time, the EKcert (if provided, else the EKpub), the signature using the asserted (but not yet bound to the EKpub) AKpub, then it will validate the PCR quote and eventlog, and, if everything checks out, will issue a certificate for the AKpub and return various secrets that the client may need.

The client obtains those items IFF (if and only if) the AK is resident in the same TPM as the EK, courtesy of TPM2_ActivateCredential()'s semantics.

NOTE well that in single round trip attestation protocols using only decrypt-only EKs it is essential that the AKcert not be logged in any public place since otherwise an attacker can make and send CS0 using a non-TPM-resident AK and any TPM's EKpub/EKcert known to the attacker, and then it may recover the AK certificate from the log in spite of being unable to recover the AK certificate from SC1!

Alternatively, a single round trip attestation protocol can be implemented as an optimization to a two round trip protocol when the AK is persisted both, in the client TPM and in the attestation service's database:

  <having previously successfully enrolled>

  CS0:  timestamp, AKpub, PCRs, eventlog,
        TPM2_Quote(AK, PCRs, extra_data)=Signed_AK({hash-of-PCRs, misc, extra_data})
  SC0:  {TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, AKpub, session_key),
         Encrypt_session_key({AKcert, filesystem_keys, etc.})}

NOTE: persisting the AK means that the AK must not have stClear set, which in turn means that it can be used and reused across reboots, so detecting reboots requires more mutable, synchronized state on the server to keep track of clients' resetCounts. Mutable, synchronized state complicates distributed databases, so it may not be desirable.

Three-Message Attestation Protocol Patterns

A single round trip protocol using encrypt-only EKpub will not demonstrate proof of possession immediately, but later on when the certified AK is used elsewhere. A proof-of-possession (PoP) may be desirable anyways for monitoring and alerting purposes.

  CS0:  [ID], EKpub, [EKcert], AKpub, PCRs, eventlog, timestamp,
        TPM2_Quote(AK, PCRs, extra_data)=Signed_AK({hash-of-PCRs, misc, extra_data})
  SC0:  {TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, AKpub, session_key),
         Encrypt_session_key({AKcert, filesystem_keys, etc.})}
  CS1:  AKcert, Signed_AK(AKcert)

(In this diagram we show the use of a TPM simulator on the server side for implementing TPM2_MakeCredential().)

NOTE well that in this protocol, like single round trip attestation protocols using only decrypt-only EKs, it is essential that the AKcert not be logged in any public place since otherwise an attacker can make and send CS0 using a non-TPM-resident AK and any TPM's EKpub/EKcert known to the attacker, and then it may recover the AK certificate from the log in spite of being unable to recover the AK certificate from SC1!

If such a protocol is instantiated over HTTP or TCP, it will really be more like a two round trip protocol:

  CS0:  [ID], EKpub, [EKcert], AKpub, PCRs, eventlog, timestamp,
        TPM2_Quote(AK, PCRs, extra_data)=Signed_AK({hash-of-PCRs, misc, extra_data})
  SC0:  {TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, AKpub, session_key),
         Encrypt_session_key({AKcert, filesystem_keys, etc.})}
  CS1:  AKcert, Signed_AK(AKcert)
  SC1:  <empty>

Two Round Trip Stateless Attestation Protocol Patterns

We can add a round trip to the protocol in the previous section to make the client prove possession of the EK and binding of the AK to the EK before it can get the items it needs. This avoids the security consideration of having to not log the AKcert.

Below is a sketch of a stateless, two round trip attestation protocol.

Actual protocols tend to use a secret challenge that the client echoes back to the server rather than a secret key possesion of which is proven with symmetriclly-keyed cryptographic algorithms.

  CS0:  [ID], EKpub, [EKcert], AKpub, PCRs, eventlog, timestamp,
        TPM2_Quote(AK, PCRs, extra_data)=Signed_AK({hash-of-PCRs, misc, extra_data})
  SC0:  {TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, AKpub, session_key), ticket}
  CS1:  {ticket, MAC_session_key(CS0), CS0}
  SC1:  Encrypt_session_key({AKcert, filesystem_keys, etc.})

  <extra_data includes timestamp>

where session_key is an ephemeral secret symmetric authenticated encryption key, and ticket is an authenticated encrypted state cookie:

  ticket = {vno, Encrypt_server_secret_key({session_key, timestamp,
                                            MAC_session_key(CS0)})}

where server_secret_key is a key known only to the attestation service and vno identifies that key (in order to support key rotation without having to try authenticated decryption twice near key rotation events).

[Note: ticket here is not in the sense used by TPM specifications, but in the sense of "TLS session resumption ticket" or "Kerberos ticket", and, really, it's just an encrypted state cookie so that the server can be stateless.]

The attestation server could validate that the timestamp is recent upon receipt of CS0. But the attestation server can delay validation of EKcert, signatures, and PCR quote and eventlog until receipt of CS1. In order to produce SC0 the server need only digest the AKpub to produce the name input of TPM2_MakeCredential(). Upon receipt of CS1 (which repeats CS0), the server can decrypt the ticket, validate the MAC of CS0, validate CS0, and produce SC1 if everything checks out.

In this protocol the client must successfully call TPM2_ActivateCredential() to obtain the session_key that it then proves possession of in CS1, and only then does the server send the AKcert and/or various secret values to the client, this time saving the cost of asymmetric encryption by using the session_key to key a symmetric authenticated cipher.

(The server_secret_key, ticket, session_key, and proof of possession used in CS1 could even conform to Kerberos or encrypted JWT and be used for authentication, possibly with an off-the-shelf HTTP stack.)

An HTTP API binding for this protocol could look like:

  POST /get-attestation-ticket
      Body: CS0
      Response: SC0

  POST /attest
      Body: CS1
      Response: SC1

Here the attestation happens in the first round trip, but the proof of possession is completed in the second, and the delivery of secrets and AKcert also happens in the second round trip.

Actual Protocols: ibmacs

The IBM TPM Attestation Client Server (ibmacs) open source project has sample code for a "TCG attestation application".

It implements a stateful (state is kept in a database) attestation and enrollment protocol over TCP sockets that consists of JSON texts of the following form, sent prefixed with a 32-bit message length in host byte order:

  CS0: {"command":"nonce","hostname":"somehostname",
        "userid":"someusername","boottime":"2021-04-29 16:37:06"}
  SC0: {"response":"nonce","nonce":"<hex>", "pcrselect":"<hex>", ...}

  <nonce is used in production of signed PCR quote>

  CS1: {"command":"quote","hostname":"somehostname",
        "quoted":"<hex>","signature":"<hex>",
        "event1":"<hex>","imaevent0":"<hex>"}
  SC1: {"response":"quote"}

  CS2: {"command":"enrollrequest","hostname":"somehost",
        "tpmvendor":"...","ekcert":"<PEM>","akpub":"<hex(DER)>"}
  SC2: {"response":"enrollrequest",
        "credentialblob":"<hex of credentialBlob output of TPM2_MakeCredential()>",
        "secret":"<hex of secret output of TPM2_MakeCredential()>"}

  CS3: {"command":"enrollcert","hostname":"somecert","challenge":"<hex>"}
  SC3: {"response":"enrollcert","akcert":"<hex>"}

The server keeps state across round trips.

Note that this protocol has up to four (4) round trips. Because the ibmacs server keeps state in a database, it should be possible to elide some of these round trips in attestations subsequent to enrollment.

The messages of the second and third round trips could be combined since there should be no need to wait for PCR quote validation before sending the EKcert and AKpub. The messages of the first round trip too could be combined with the messages of the second and third round trip by using a timestamp as a nonce -- with those changes this protocol would get down to two round trips.

Actual Protocols: safeboot.dev

Safeboot.dev uses a single round trip stateless attestation protocol, with a separate, one-time enrollment protocol.

  CS0:  [ID], EKpub, [EKcert], AKpub, PCRs, eventlog, timestamp,
        TPM2_Quote(AK, PCRs, extra_data)=Signed_AK({hash-of-PCRs, misc, extra_data})
  SC0:  {TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, AKpub, session_key),
         Encrypt_session_key({long-term-secrets-encrypted-to-EKpub})}

    with

      long-term-secrets-encrypted-to-EKpub =
          [{TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, WKname(policy), aes_key0),
            Encrypt_aes_key0(secret0)},
           {TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, WKname(policy), aes_key1),
            Encrypt_aes_key1(secret1)},
           ..,
           {TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, WKname(policy), aes_keyN),
            Encrypt_aes_key1(secretN)}]

During an initial enrollment step, the enrollment server can create any number of secrets to deliver to the client later:

• local storage / filesystem keys

• private keys and certificates (PKIX, OpenSSH)

• OpenSSH host keys

• Kerberos keys

• etc.

Attestation Protocol Patterns and Actual Protocols (signing-only EKs)

Some TPMs come provisioned with signing-only endorsement keys in addition to decrypt-only EKs. For example, vTPMs in Google cloud provides both, decrypt-only and signing-only EKs.

Signing-only EKs can be used for attestation as well.

[Ideally signing-only EKs can be restricted to force the use of TPM2_Certify()? Restricted signing keys can only sign payloads that start with a magic value, whereas unrestricted signing keys can sign any payload.]

Signing-only EKs make single round trip attestation protocols possible that also provide immediate attestation status because signing provides proof of possession non-interactively, whereas asymmetric encryption requires interaction to prove possession:

  CS0:  timestamp, [ID], EKpub, [EKcert], AKpub, PCRs, eventlog,
        TPM2_Certify(EKpub, AKpub), TPM2_Quote()
  SC0:  AKcert

If secrets need to be sent back, then a decrypt-only EK also neds to be used:

  CS0:  timestamp, [ID], EKpub_signing, EKpub_encrypt,
        [EKcert_signing], [EKcert_encrypt], AKpub, PCRs, eventlog,
        TPM2_Certify(EKpub, AKpub), TPM2_Quote()
  SC0:  {TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub_encrypt, AKpub, session_key),
         Encrypt_session_key({AKcert, filesystem_keys, etc.})}

Long-Term State Kept by Attestation Services

Attestation servers need to keep some long-term state:

• binding of EKpub and ID
• PCR validation profile(s) for each identified client
• resetCount (for reboot detection)

Log-like attestation state:

• client attestation status (last time successfully attested, last time unsuccessfully attested)

The PCR validation profile for a client consists of a set of required and/or acceptable digests that must appear in each PCR's extension log. These required and/or acceptable digests may be digests of firmware images, boot loaders, boot loader configurations (e.g., menu.lst, for Grub), operating system kernels, initrd images, filesystem root hashes (think ZFS), etc.

Some of these are obtained by administrators on a trust-on-first-use (TOFU) basis.

Things to log:

• client attestation attempts and outcomes
• AK certificates issued (WARNING: see note about single round trip attestation protocols above -- do not log AKcerts in public places when using single round trip attestation protocols!)

Long-Term State Created or Updated by Attestation Services

• An attestation service might support creation of host<->EKpub bindings on a first-come-first-served basis. In this mode the attestation server might validate an EKcert and that the desired hostname has not been bound to an EK, then create the binding.

• An attestation service might support deletion of host PCR validation profiles that represent past states upon validation of PCR quotes using newer profiles. This could be used to permit firmware and/or operating system upgrades and then disallow downgrades after evidence of successful upgrade.

• An attestation service might keep track of client reboots so as to:

  • revoke old AKcerts when the client reboots (but note that this is really not necessary if we trust the client's TPM, since then the previous AKs will never be usable again)
  • alert if the reboot count ever goes backwards

Schema for Attestation Server Database

A schema for the attestation server's database entries might look like:

{
  "EKpub": "<EKpub>",
  "hostname": "<hostname>",
  "EKcert": "<EKcert in PEM, if available>",
  "previous_firmware_profile": "FWProfile0",
  "current_firmware_profiles": ["FWProfile1", "FWProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_operating_system_profiles": "OSProfile0",
  "current_operating_system_profiles": ["OSProfile1", "OSProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_PCRs": "<...>",
  "proposed_PCRs": "<...>",
  "ak_cert_template": "<AKCertTemplate>",
  "resetCount": "<resetCount value from last quote>",
  "secrets": "<see below>"
}

The attestation server's database should have two lookup keys:

• EKpub
• hostname

The attestation server's database's entry for any client should provide, de minimis:

• a way to validate the root of trust measurements in the client's quoted PCRs, for which two methods are possible:
  • save the PCRs quoted last as the ones expected next time
  • or, name profiles for validating firmware RTM PCRs and profiles for validating operating system RTM PCRs

A profile for validating PCRs should contain a set of expected extension values for each of a set of PCRs. The attestation server can then check that the eventlog submitted by the client lists exactly those extension values and no others. PCR extension order in the eventlog probably doesn't matter here. If multiple profiles are named, then one of those must match -- this allows for upgrades and downgrades.

{
  "profile_name":"SomeProfile",
  "values":[
    {
      "PCR":0,
      "values":["aaaaaaa","bbbbbb","..."]
    },
    {
      "PCR":1,
      "values":["ccccccc","dddddd","..."]
    }
  ]
}

Using the PCR values from the previous attestation makes upgrades tricky, probably requiring an authenticated and authorized administrator to bless new PCR values after an upgrade. A client that presents a PCR quote that does not match the previous one would cause the proposed_PCRs field to be updated but otherwise could not continue, then an administrator would confirm that the client just did a firmware/OS upgrade and if so replace the previous_PCRs with the proposed_PCRs, then the client could attempt attestation again.

Delivery of Secrets to Attestation Clients

An attestation server might have to return storage/filesystem decryption key-encryption-keys (KEKs) to a client. But one might not want to store those keys in the clear on the attestation server. As well, one might want a break-glass way to recover those secrets.

Possible goals:

• store secrets that clients need on the attestation server
• do not store plaintext or plaintext-equivalent secrets on the attestation server
• allow for adding more secrets to send to the client after enrollment
• provide a break-glass recovery mechanism

Note that in all cases the client does get direct access to various secrets. Using a TPM to prevent direct software access to those secrets would not be performant if, for example, those secrets are being used to encrypt filesystems. We must inherently trust the client to keep those secrets safe when running.

Break-Glass Recovery and Escrow

For break-glass recovery, the simplest thing to do is to store Encrypt_backupKey({EKpub, hostname, secrets}), where backupKey is an asymmetric key whose private key is stored offline (e.g., in a safe, or in an offline HSM). To break the glass and recover the key, just bring the ciphertext to the offline system where the private backup key is kept, decrypt it, and then use the secrets manually to recover the affected system.

Secret Transport Sub-Protocols

Here we describe several possible sub-protocols of attestation protocols for secret transport. This list is almost certainly not exhaustive.

Store a TPM2_MakeCredential() Payload

TPM2_MakeCredential() and TPM2_ActivateCredential() are a form of limited asymmetric encryption (TPM2_MakeCredential()) and asymmetric decryption (TPM2_ActivateCredential()) subject to the sender's choice of authorization. The details are explained here and here. Basically, there are two TPM key objects involved:

• a transport key (typically the EK),
• and an authorization key (typically an AK)

and the caller of TPM2_MakeCredential() must specify the public part of the transport key and the name of the authorization key, along with a small secret to transport. The caller of TPM2_ActivateCredential() must then provide the handles for those two key objects and the outputs of TPM2_MakeCredential() in order to extract the small secret. Typically the small secret is an AES key for encrypting larger secrets.

So if we can store the outputs of TPM2_MakeCredential() long-term so that the client can activate over multiple reboots, then we have a way to deliver secrets to the client.

We'll discuss two ways to do this:

• use a WK -- a universally well-known key (thus WK, for well-known)

  Since the WK's private area is not used for any cryptography in TPM2_MakeCredential()/TPM2_ActivateCredential(), it can be a key that everyone knows.

  Note that the WK's public area can name arbitrary an auth policy, and TPM2_MakeCredential() will enforce it.

  E.g., the WK could be the all-zeros AES key. Its policy could be whatever is appropriate for the organization. For example, the policy could require that some non-resettable application PCR have the value zero so that extending it can disable use of TPM2_MakeCredential() post-boot.

  We have two sample bash scripts demonstrating this approach:

  • send-to-tpm.sh
  • tpm-receive.sh

• use an LTAK -- a long-term AK

  I.e., an AK that lacks the stClear attribute, and preferably created deterministically with either TPM2_CreateLoaded() or TPM2_CreatePrimary().

  Note that the LTAK need not be a primary.

  If the LTAK were created with TPM2_Create() then the key's saved context file would have to be stored somewhere so that it could be loaded again on next boot with TPM2_Load(). Whereas creating it deterministically means that it can be re-created every time it's needed using the same hiercarchy, template, and entropy as arguments to TPM2_CreatePrimary() or TPM2_CreateLoaded()

  Note that the AK's public area can name arbitrary an auth policy, and TPM2_MakeCredential() will enforce it.

The best option here is to use a WK because using an LTAK would require recording its public key in the device's enrolled attestation state, which would complicate enrollment, whereas the WK, being well-known and the same for all cases, would not need to be recorded in server-side attestation state.

One might like to use the EK as the activateHandle. Sadly, this is not possible. While TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, EKname, input) works, TPM2_ActivateCredential(EK, EK, credentialBlob, secret) does not and cannot.

The reason for this is that TPM2_ActivateCredential() requires ADMIN role for the activateHandle, and since the EK has adminWithPolicy attribute set and its policy doesn't have the TPM_CC_ACTIVATECREDENTIAL command permitted, the call must fail.

Credit for the WK idea goes to Erik > Larsson.

Normally during attestation we want to use an AK with stClear set so that each boot forces the client to use a new one. However, for sending secrets to the client via TPM2_MakeCredential() / TPM2_ActivateCredential() we really need need the activateHandle object to not have stClear set.

For this approach then, the best solution is to use a WK.

  CS0:  timestamp, AKpub, PCRs, eventlog,
        TPM2_Quote(AK, PCRs, extra_data)=Signed_AK({hash-of-PCRs, misc, extra_data})
  SC0:  {TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, AKname, session_key),
         Encrypt_session_key(long_term_Credential)}

    where

      long_term_Credential = TPM2_MakeCredential(EKpub, WKname, secrets)

New secrets can be added at any time without interaction with the client if the attestation server recalls the LTAKname.

The schema for storing secrets transported this way would be:

{
  "EKpub": "<EKpub>",
  "hostname": "<hostname>",
  "EKcert": "<EKcert in PEM, if available>",
  "previous_firmware_profile": "FWProfile0",
  "current_firmware_profiles": ["FWProfile1", "FWProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_operating_system_profiles": "OSProfile0",
  "current_operating_system_profiles": ["OSProfile1", "OSProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_PCRs": "<...>",
  "proposed_PCRs": "<...>",
  "resetCount": "<resetCount value from last quote>",

  "secret store and transport fields":"vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv",

  "secrets": ["<MakeCredential_0>", "<MakeCredential_1>", "..", "<MakeCredential_N>"]
  "secrets_backup": ["<RSA_Encrypt_to_backup_key(...)", "..."],
}

Use an Unrestricted Decryption Transport Key (TK) for Secret Transport (client-side)

Another option is to generate an asymmetric key-pair at device enrollment time (we shall call this the "transport key", or TK), and store:

• the TKpub, and

• zero, one, or more secrets encrypted in the EKpub.

The client has to use TPM2_CreatePrimary() or TPM2_CreateLoaded() in order to deterministically create the same TK (without the stClear) attribute, else if it uses TPM2_Create() then it must store the key save file somewhere (possibly in the attestation server!) or make the key object persistent.

New secrets can be added at any time without interaction with the client.

{
  "EKpub": "<EKpub>",
  "hostname": "<hostname>",
  "EKcert": "<EKcert in PEM, if available>",
  "previous_firmware_profile": "FWProfile0",
  "current_firmware_profiles": ["FWProfile1", "FWProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_operating_system_profiles": "OSProfile0",
  "current_operating_system_profiles": ["OSProfile1", "OSProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_PCRs": "<...>",
  "proposed_PCRs": "<...>",
  "ak_cert_template": "<AKCertTemplate>",
  "resetCount": "<resetCount value from last quote>",

  "secret store and transport fields":"vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv",

  "TKpub": "<TKpub in PEM>",
  "secrets": ["<RSA_Encrypt_0>", "<RSA_Encrypt_1>", "..", "<RSA_Encrypt_N>"]
  "secrets_backup": ["<RSA_Encrypt_to_backup_key(...)", "..."],
}

Use an Unrestricted Decryption Transport Key (TK) for Secret Transport (server-side)

Another option is to generate an asymmetric key-pair at device enrollment time (we shall call this the "transport key", or TK), and store:

• the TK exported to the client device's TPM (i.e., the output of TPM2_Duplicate() called on that private key to export it to the client's TPM's EKpub), and

• the ciphertext resulting from encrypting long-term secrets to that TK.

At attestation time the server can send back these two values to the client, and then the client can TPM2_Import() and then TPM2_Load() the duplicated (exported) TK, then use it to TPM2_RSA_Decrypt() the encrypted long-term secrets.

New secrets can be added at any time without interaction with the client.

{
  "EKpub": "<EKpub>",
  "hostname": "<hostname>",
  "EKcert": "<EKcert in PEM, if available>",
  "previous_firmware_profile": "FWProfile0",
  "current_firmware_profiles": ["FWProfile1", "FWProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_operating_system_profiles": "OSProfile0",
  "current_operating_system_profiles": ["OSProfile1", "OSProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_PCRs": "<...>",
  "proposed_PCRs": "<...>",
  "ak_cert_template": "<AKCertTemplate>",
  "resetCount": "<resetCount value from last quote>",

  "secret store and transport fields":"vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv",

  "TKdup": "<output of TPM2_Duplicate(EKpub, TK)>",
  "TKpub": "<TKpub in PEM>",
  "secrets": ["<RSA_Encrypt_0>", "<RSA_Encrypt_1>", "..", "<RSA_Encrypt_N>"]
  "secrets_backup": ["<RSA_Encrypt_to_backup_key(...)", "..."],
}

Store a Secret PCR Extension Value for Unsealing Data Objects

The attestation server could store in plaintext a secret that it will returned encrypted to the client's EKpub vias TPM2_MakeCredential(), and which the client must use to extend a PCR (e.g., the debug PCR) to get that PCR into the state needed to unseal a persistent data object on the TPM.

Because the sealed data object may itself be stored in cleartext in the TPM's NVRAM, and because an attacker might be able to decap a stolen client device's TPM and recover the TPM's NVRAM contents and seeds, the client might store an encrypted value in that sealed data object that the TPM does not have the keey to decrypt. The decryption key would be sent by the attestation server (possibly being the same secret as is extended into that PCR).

{
  "EKpub": "<EKpub>",
  "hostname": "<hostname>",
  "EKcert": "<EKcert in PEM, if available>",
  "previous_firmware_profile": "FWProfile0",
  "current_firmware_profiles": ["FWProfile1", "FWProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_operating_system_profiles": "OSProfile0",
  "current_operating_system_profiles": ["OSProfile1", "OSProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_PCRs": "<...>",
  "proposed_PCRs": "<...>",
  "ak_cert_template": "<AKCertTemplate>",
  "resetCount": "<resetCount value from last quote>",

  "secret store and transport fields":"vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv",

  "unseal_key": "<key>",
  "secrets_backup": ["<RSA_Encrypt_to_backup_key(...)", "..."],
}

Store Secrets in Plaintext, Encrypt to EKpub Using TPM2_MakeCredential()

As the title says, one option is to store the secrets in plaintext and send them encrypted to the EKpub via TPM2_MakeCredential(). Because TPM2_MakeCredential() encrypts only a small secret, it goes without saying that that secret would be a one-time use symmetric encryption key that would be used to encrypt the actual secrets.

This is, naturally, the least desirable option.

{
  "EKpub": "<EKpub>",
  "hostname": "<hostname>",
  "EKcert": "<EKcert in PEM, if available>",
  "previous_firmware_profile": "FWProfile0",
  "current_firmware_profiles": ["FWProfile1", "FWProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_operating_system_profiles": "OSProfile0",
  "current_operating_system_profiles": ["OSProfile1", "OSProfile2", "..."],
  "previous_PCRs": "<...>",
  "proposed_PCRs": "<...>",
  "ak_cert_template": "<AKCertTemplate>",
  "resetCount": "<resetCount value from last quote>",

  "secret store and transport fields":"vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv",

  "secrets": ["<secret_0>", "<secret_1>", "<secret_N>"]
}

Security Considerations

TBD

References

• TCG TPM Library part 1: Architecture, sections 23 and 24
• https://sourceforge.net/projects/ibmtpm20acs/
• https://safeboot.dev/
• https://github.com/osresearch/safeboot/