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Intro: Describe encrypted sessions
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Nicolas Williams
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2 changed files with 233 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -606,6 +606,9 @@ other state. TPM commands may check that an authorization session's
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state satisfies the requirements for use of the argument objects passed
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to the commands.
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> NOTE: Every command input parameter that is a handle that requires
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> authorization must have its own session associated with it.
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### Authorization Session State
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Authorization sessions have a number of state attributes. Some of these
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@ -688,13 +691,89 @@ ways. These state attributes are:
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### Encryption Sessions
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> Work in progress.
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Sessions can also be used for encrypting TPM command arguments and
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results. This can be useful when one does not trust the path to the
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TPM, such as when the TPM is remote.
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> TODO: Discuss key exchange options, etc.
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Only the first input parameter of a TPM command will be encrypted, and
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only the first output parameter of a TPM command will be encrypted, and
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that only if when that first parameter is of type `TPM2B`. Those first
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`TPM2B` type command input and/or output parameters will be encrypted
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with a symmetrict AES key derived from a secret key established via RSA
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key transport or ECDH key agreement.
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> Encryption sessions are useful for when the path to a TPM is not
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> trused, such as when a TPM is a remote TPM, or when otherwise the path
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> to the TPM is not trusted.
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### Key Exchange for Encryption Sessions
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> Encryption sessions are useful for when the path to a TPM is not
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> trused, such as when a TPM is a remote TPM, or when otherwise the path
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> to the TPM is not trusted. This section talks about key exchange for
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> such situations.
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The symmetric keys used for TPM command encryption are exchanged at
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session creation time.
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Keys can be provided by one of either RSA key transport or ECC key
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agreement, and/or the secret `authValue` of a loaded entity.
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Sessions are created with
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[`TPM2_StartAuthSession()`](/TPM-Commands/TPM2_StartAuthSession.md),
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which has serveral _optional_ input and output parameters related to
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session encryption. In particular it provides ways to create a session
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key for command parameter encryption:
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- RSA key transport
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The caller can encrypt a secret to a public key for which the TPM has
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loaded the private key as identified by the `tpmKey` input parameter
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of [`TPM2_StartAuthSession()`].
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- ECDH key agreement
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The caller can generate an ephemeral ECDH key and use it with the
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public key of the ECDH key object identified by the `tpmKey` input
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parameter of [`TPM2_StartAuthSession()`]. The TPM will use the
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private key of the object identified by the `tpmKey` input parameter
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and the ephemeral public key sent by the caller in the
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`encryptedSalt` input parameter.
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- use the `authHash` of the entity identified by the `bind` input
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parameter
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The caller computes the same session key as the TPM.
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To authenticate the TPM and prevent active attacks, the caller of
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`TPM2_StartAuthSession()` should use an `EK` as the `tpmKey` and its
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`EKpub` to locally compute the session key. Alternatively the caller
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can use a non-`EK` key object created over an earlier encrypted session
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that authenticated the target TPM.
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> A non-null `bind` parameter can be used to create a "bound" session
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> that can be used to satisfy HMAC-based authorization for specific
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> objects. We will not cover this in detail here.
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### HMAC Sessions
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An HMAC session proves the caller knows the `authValue` secret of some
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entity. This functions a lot like a password, with the `authValue`
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used to compute HMACs that prove possession, but with the `authValue`
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generally being large and randomly generated, thus much stronger than a
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password.
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Typically the `authValue` of some entity should be sent encrypted to the
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TPM when creating an entity, with [the encrypted session being keyed via
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RSA key transport or ECDH](#Key-Exchange-for-Encryption-Sessions). This
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way an `authValue`, though a simple, password-like binary string, can be
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strong and secure due to being large, randomly chosen and sent over
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an encrypted session.
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### Password Sessions
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> WIP [Say something about passwords and password sessions, besides
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> "don't use them" and "support remains mostly for TPM 1.2 reasons".]
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## Restricted Cryptographic Keys
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151
TPM-Commands/TPM2_StartAuthSession.md
Normal file
151
TPM-Commands/TPM2_StartAuthSession.md
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
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# `TPM2_StartAuthSession()`
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This command starts a session that can be used for authorization and/or
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encryption.
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## Inputs
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- `TPMI_DH_OBJECT+ tpmKey`
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This optional _input_ parameter specifies the handle of a loaded RSA
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decryption key or of a loaded ECDH key.
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- `TPMI_DH_ENTITY+ bind`
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This parameter, if not null, references a loaded entity whose
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`authValue` will be used in the session key computation.
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- `TPM2B_NONCE nonceCaller`
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This is a nonce chosen by the caller.
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- `TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET encryptedSalt`
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This optional _input_ parameter must be present if `tpmKey` is
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present.
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If `tpmKey` is an RSA decryption key then `encryptedSalt` must be an
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RSA OEAP ciphertext that will be decrypted with the `tpmKey`. The
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plaintext will be used to derive symmetric AES-CFB encryption keys.
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If `tpmKey` is an ECDH key, then `encryptedSalt` must be a public key
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that will be used to generate a shared secret key from which
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symmetric AES-CFB encryption keys will be derived.
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- `TPM_SE sessionType`
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- `TPMT_SYM_DEF+ symmetric`
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- `TPMI_ALG_HASH authHash`
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A hash algorithm for the key derivation function.
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## Outputs (success case)
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- `TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION sessionHandle`
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- `TPM2B_NONCE nonceTPM`
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This is an _output_ parameter that is generated by the TPM, and it is
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a nonce that is used for key derivation.
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## Session Types
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The `sessionType` input parameter must be one of:
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- `TPM_SE_HMAC`
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- `TPM_SE_POLICY`
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- `TPM_SE_TRIAL`
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### HMAC Sessions
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If the session is to be an HMAC session authenticating knowledge of some
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entity's `authValue`, then the `bind` argument must be provided.
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### Authorization Sessions
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For policy sessions, the caller should now call one or more
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`TPM2_Policy*()` commands to execute the policy identified by the
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`authPolicy` value of the entity to be accessed via this session.
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### Trial Policies
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For trial sessions, the caller should now call one or more
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`TPM2_Policy*()` commands as will be used in future actual policy
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sessions, then extract the `policyDigest` of the
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session after the last policy command -- that will be a value
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suitablefor use as an `authPolicy` value for TPM entities.
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### Encryption Sessions
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> All sessions can be used for encryption that were created with either
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> or both of the `bind` input parameter and the pair of input parameters
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> `tpmKey` and `encryptedSalt` set.
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> Encryption sessions are useful for when the path to a TPM is not
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> trused, such as when a TPM is a remote TPM, or when otherwise the path
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> to the TPM is not trusted. This section talks about key exchange for
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> such situations.
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For encryption sessions the `symmetric` parameter should also be set.
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Encryption sessions can have a session key derived from either or both
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of the `authValue` of the `bind` entity or the key exchange represented
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by the `tpmKey` and `encryptedSalt` inputs. The `nonceCaller` input and
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the `nonceTPM` output will also salt the key derivation.
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The symmetric keys used for TPM command encryption are set at session
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creation time.
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Session keys are derived from the `tpmKey` and `encryptedSalt` inputs
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(if provided) and the `authValue` of a loaded entity referred to by
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`bind` (if provided), along with the nonces and other things.
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The `tpmKey` and `encryptedSalt` inputs can inject a secret either via
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RSA key transport or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).
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The key will be derived as follows:
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- if `tpmKey` and `encryptedSalt` are provided, then the key is
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recovered (RSA case) or computed (ECDH case)
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In the RSA case the `encryptedSalt` is the ciphertext resulting from
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RSA PKCS#2 (OEAP) encryption to the public key of the object referred
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to by `tpmKey`. The TPM will decrypt the `encryptedSalt` to recover
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the secret.
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In the ECDH case the `encryptedSalt` is an ephemeral public key, and
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the secret will be the ECDH shared secret constructed from that key
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and the private part of the `tpmKey`.
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- then the internal `KDFa()` function will invoked as follows:
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```
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sessionKey := KDFa(authHash,
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(bind.authValue || tmpKey.get(encryptedSalt)),
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"ATH",
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nonceTPM,
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nonceCaller,
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authHash.digestSize)
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```
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where:
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- `bind.authValue` is the `authValue` of the `bind` entity (if
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provided)
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- `tmpKey.get(encryptedSalt)` is the result of RSA decryption of
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`encryptedSalt` if `tpmKey` is an RSA key, or the result of ECDH
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key agreement between the private part of `tpmKey` and the public
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ECDH key in `encryptedSalt` if `tpmKey` is an ECDH key
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To avoid active attacks, one would use the EK as the `tpmKey` input
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parameter of `TPM2_StartAuthSession()`. Or one could use a `tpmKey`
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input created with, e.g., `TPM2_Create()` over another encrypted session
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that itself used the EK as its `tpmKey` input.
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> A non-null `bind` parameter can be used to create a "bound" session
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> that can be used to satisfy HMAC-based authorization for specific
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> objects. We will not cover this in detail here.
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## References
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- [TCG TPM Library part 1: Architecture, sections 18.6, 19, and 21](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture.pdf)
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- [TCG TPM Library part 3: Commands, section 11.1](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part3_Commands_pub.pdf)
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