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21 lines
873 B
Markdown
21 lines
873 B
Markdown
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# Endorsement Keys are (Generally) Decrypt-Only
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All TPMs (2.0) must have decrypt-only Endorsement Keys (EKs).
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Some TPMs may have signing-only EKs. E.g., Google cloud vTPMs have
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signing-only EKs as well as decrypt-only EKs.
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Somehow one must make do with decrypt-only EKs to authenticate a TPM.
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The obvious answer is to make the TPM prove possession of an EK by
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sending a challenge encrypted to the EK's public key (EKpub).
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This is what [`TPM2_MakeCredential()`](TPM2_MakeCredential.md) (encrypt)
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and [`TPM2_ActivateCredential()`](TPM2_ActivateCredential.md) (decrypt)
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are all about, except that they add some structure to the plaintext and
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semantics to the decryption function.
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See [README](README.md) for details of how
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[`TPM2_MakeCredential()`](TPM2_MakeCredential.md) and
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[`TPM2_ActivateCredential()`](TPM2_ActivateCredential.md) are used in
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attestation protocols.
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