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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Lets get started:
TR is suitable for casual threat models. These techniques typically aim to remove trackers or to block malicious traffic.
If someone just wants to browse the web with less tracking, theyre probably not expecting a “nuclear option” that removes all their personalization. That user is more likely to be concerned with manipulation by personalized ads, or something vague such as being “followed around” as they browse websites while signed out.
If someone just wants to browse the web with less tracking, theyre probably not expecting a “nuclear option” that removes all their personalization. That user is more likely to concerned with manipulation by personalized ads, or something vague such as being “followed around” as they browse websites while signed out.
These users are likely okay with being identified by a site; several of their accounts are probably linked to the same identity. However, when they log into “example.com”, theyd rather not ping trackers from “facebook.com” or “amazon-adsystem.com”.
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ The most common amnesiac technique is clearing cookies. A more thorough techniqu
=> https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Disposables Qubes Disposables
The list goes on. “TR versus TE” is an important perspective to have, but it isnt the only lens through which we should view privacy-enhancing techniques. Lets be mindful of the TR/TE frameworks limitations.
The list goes on. “TR versus TE” is an important perspective to have, but it isnt the only lens through which we should view privacy-enhancing techniques. Lets be mindful the TR/TE frameworks limitations.
## How to make privacy recommendations

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@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Tracking reduction (TR)
<abbr title="Tracking Reduction">TR</abbr> is suitable for casual threat models. These techniques typically aim to remove trackers or to block malicious traffic.
If someone just wants to browse the web with less tracking, they're probably not expecting a "nuclear option" that removes all their personalization. That user is more likely to be concerned with manipulation by personalized ads, or something vague such as being "followed around" as they browse websites while signed out.
If someone just wants to browse the web with less tracking, they're probably not expecting a "nuclear option" that removes all their personalization. That user is more likely to concerned with manipulation by personalized ads, or something vague such as being "followed around" as they browse websites while signed out.
These users are likely okay with being identified by a site; several of their accounts are probably linked to the same identity. However, when they log into "example.com", they'd rather not ping trackers from "facebook.com" or "amazon-adsystem.com".
@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ Goodness enumeration
Amnesia
: The most common amnesiac technique is clearing cookies. A more thorough technique is [using a disposable VM](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Disposables) that's erased and re-created between sessions. Rather than reduce or evade tracking, these measures reduce the persistence of trackers (and/or malware) that slip through other defenses.
The list goes on. "TR versus TE" is an important perspective to have, but it isn't the only lens through which we should view privacy-enhancing techniques. Let's be mindful of the TR/TE framework's limitations.
The list goes on. "TR versus TE" is an important perspective to have, but it isn't the only lens through which we should view privacy-enhancing techniques. Let's be mindful the TR/TE framework's limitations.
How to make privacy recommen&shy;dations {#how-to-make-privacy-recommendataions}
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