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Seirdy 2024-09-25 11:57:26 -04:00
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content/posts/post-ocsp-revocation.md
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@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ Today, Certificate Authority Authorization (<abbr>CAA</abbr>) DNS records restri
- Restrict issuance to short-lived certificates.
- Restrict approved delegates for delegated credentials.
With the first extension, an attacker who triggers a misissuance would compromise it for a few days or hours months. The second extension limits the potential for rogue delegates to serve traffic on behalf of an <abbr>IdO</abbr>.
With the first extension, an attacker who triggers a misissuance would compromise it for a few days or hours rather than months. The second extension limits the potential for rogue delegates to serve traffic on behalf of an <abbr>IdO</abbr>.
I want to see the protections offered by Expect-Staple preloading for short-lived certificates. HTTPS Resource Records (<abbr>RRs</abbr>) or client-side preload lists can proactively tell clients to distrust any long-lived certificate for a domain.[^12]