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16 lines
827 B
Markdown
16 lines
827 B
Markdown
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title: "Lose-able keys are a feature"
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date: 2024-09-12T20:30:14-04:00
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#syndicatedCopies:
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# - title: 'The Fediverse'
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# url: ''
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# - title: 'Bluesky'
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# url: ''
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---
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In opsec, [duress ("rubber-hose") attacks are famously hard to address](https://xkcd.com/538/). Cryptographic keys that cannot be lost have poor protections against duress.
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Travelers can leave key fobs at home should they be accosted. A victim of a break-in can conveniently "lose" or smash a hardware key, erasing any encrypted data. Yes, I know about cold-boot attacks; I don't recommend at-risk people to leave things decrypted for long durations. I like the idea of spring-loaded key fobs that can't be left plugged in.
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People talking about key fob body implants don't usually plan for removing them in seconds with plausible deniability.
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