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18 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
18 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
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title: "OpenSSL replacements"
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date: 2022-07-06T09:31:42-07:00
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replyURI: "https://social.treehouse.systems/@ariadne/108601160601729437"
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replyTitle: "I am going to…write an OpenSSL wrapper for BearSSL and just make OpenSSL die in Alpine entirely"
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replyType: "https://schema.org/SocialMediaPosting"
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replyAuthor: "Ariadne Conill"
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replyAuthorURI: "https://ariadne.space"
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Are you referring to making an OpenSSL-compatible API, so OpenSSL-only programs can link against BearSSL?
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I really like BearSSL for TLS 1.2: it's tiny, runs well on old hardware, and has no dynamic memory allocation. I do have serious doubts for making it the default TLS library when it doesn't support TLS 1.3. Looking at commit logs, I doubt it'll get 1.3 anytime soon.
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mbedTLS, LibreSSL, WolfSSL, s2n-tls, MatrixSSL, GnuTLS (eww), BoringSSL, picotls, NSS, even Fizz and Rustls (just including these two for completeness) all support 1.3 and can be linked in C programs; picking the one high-profile implementation lacking it seems like a bad idea. Perhaps wrapping BearSSL and a TLS 1.3 implementation (like picotls) could work?
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Personally, I'd like to see adoption of more 1.3 extensions to reduce information leakage, such as Encrypted Client Hello or random padding.
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