posts/secure_boot.md

@@ -30,12 +30,13 @@ software.
 
 ## Secure Boot, the technology
 
-Secure Boot[^spec] is an attempt at ensuring that only authorized software is run on a
+Secure Boot[^spec] helps running only authorized software on a machine. It
-machine. It does so by bootstrapping the security of the system at boot time,
+does so by bootstrapping the security of the system at boot time, by verifying
-giving way to other technologies to keep the system secure, later on. Secure
+signatures on various software components, before giving way to other
-boot works by authorizing only select executables to be run. Authorized
+technologies to keep the system secure, later on. Secure boot works by
-executables are signed using public cryptography, and the keys used to verify
+authorizing only select executables to be run. Authorized executables are
-those signatures are stored securely in UEFI "databases".
+signed using public cryptography, and the keys used to verify those signatures
+are stored securely in UEFI "databases".
 
 [^spec]: [UEFI Specifications](https://uefi.org/specs/access)
 
@@ -48,26 +49,28 @@ the case of GNU/Systemd/Linux, the bootloader runs the Linux kernel, which
 shuts down all UEFI Boot Services, before dropping its privileges and then
 doing "Linux stuff" (like starting the userland part of the operating system).
 This privilege drop is very important because this is what ensures that no code
-past that point is able to tamper with the UEFI environment, including UEFI
+past that point is able to tamper with the UEFI sensitive information,
-variables, which contains sensitive data.
+including UEFI variables, which contains sensitive data.
 
 Secure Boot aims at securing "everything" that is executed prior to that
-privilege drop. Once the privileges are drop, it is up to the operating system
+privilege drop. Once the privileges are drop, Secure Boot is done and it is up
-to ensure that only authorized software is run. Most Linux distros do not even
+to the operating system to extend that integrity/authenticity protection and
-try to do it, although there are notable exceptions (Chrome OS, Android, just
+ensure that only authorized software is run. Most Linux distros do not even try
-to name a few). If we run one of the distros that do not leverage technologies
+to do it, although there are notable exceptions (Chrome OS, Android, just to
+name a few). If we run one of the distros that do not leverage technologies
 such as dm-verity, fs-verity (with signatures) or Linux IMA (Integrity
-Management Architecture), then Secure Boot is strictly insufficient to protect
+Management Architecture), then Secure Boot protected the boot integrity for
-user data integrity or even system integrity in general.
+basically nothing, because the security chain is broken by the operating
+system, and user data is at risk from possibly any tainted userland executable.
 
 Nevertheless, ANSSI, the French Infosec Agency recommends in its GNU/Linux
 security guide[^linuxguide] to enable Secure Boot (R3) for all systems
 requiring medium security level (level 2 out of 4, 1 being the minimal
-requirements and 4 being for highly secure systems). Meanwhile, using a Unified
+requirements and 4 being for highly secure systems). Meanwhile, using a Unified
 Kernel Image to bundle the Linux kernel with a initramfs into a single
 executable that can be verified by Secure Boot is only recommended[^R6] for
 highly secure systems (security level 4 out of 4). No recommendation is ever
-done about using one of the aforementioned integrity features to ensure
+done about using one of the aforementioned integrity features to ensure
 operating system integrity.
 
 [^linuxguide]: no English version yet. [French version](https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2019/02/fr_np_linux_configuration-v2.0.pdf)
@@ -81,46 +84,48 @@ level, and 45% even think that it should be a minimum requirement.
 This article is a strong push-back against ANSSI "recommendation", and it
 attempts to prove that it is not only useless but incoherent and misleading.
 
-[^poll]: [Mastodon poll](https://infosec.exchange/@x_cli/109348532363333158)
+[^poll]: [Mastodon poll](https://infosec.exchange/@x_cli/109348532363333158)
 
 ## Signature verification and default public keys
 
 Secure boot relies on a set of public keys to verify authorized software
 authenticity. By default, most vendors ship Microsoft public keys. These keys
 sign all Microsoft Windows version, of course, but to avoid a monopoly, other
-executables were signed. The list is rather short because with each signature
+executables were signed. The list is ought to be short (and unfortunately, it
-and authorized software, the attack surface grows and the probability of a
+is not) because with each signature and authorized software, the attack surface
-vulnerability raises. Several were already found in the recent past (e.g.
+grows and the probability of a vulnerability raises. Several were already found
-CVE-2020-10713[^CVE-2020-10713], CVE-2022-34301[^CVE-2022-34301],
+in the recent past (e.g. CVE-2020-10713[^CVE-2020-10713],
-CVE-2022-34302[^CVE-2022-34302], CVE-2022-34303[^CVE-2022-34303].
+CVE-2022-34301[^CVE-2022-34301], CVE-2022-34302[^CVE-2022-34302],
+CVE-2022-34303[^CVE-2022-34303].
 
-[^CVE-2020-10713]: [CVE-2020-10713](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-10713)
+[^CVE-2020-10713]: [CVE-2020-10713](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-10713)
 
-[^CVE-2022-34301]: [CVE-2022-34301](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-34301)
+[^CVE-2022-34301]: [CVE-2022-34301](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-34301)
 
-[^CVE-2022-34302]: [CVE-2022-34302](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-34302)
+[^CVE-2022-34302]: [CVE-2022-34302](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-34302)
 
-[^CVE-2022-34303]: [CVE-2022-34303](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-34303)
+[^CVE-2022-34303]: [CVE-2022-34303](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-34303)
 
 For this reason, many software still require that Secure Boot be deactivated,
 including firmware updates by some manufacturers, including
 Intel[^intelUpgrade] or Lenovo[^lenovoUpgrade].
 
-[^intelUpgrade]: [Intel UEFI Flash BIOS Update Instruction](https://www.intel.com/content/dam/support/us/en/documents/mini-pcs/UEFI-Flash-BIOS-Update-Instructions.pdf)
+[^intelUpgrade]: [Intel UEFI Flash BIOS Update Instruction](https://www.intel.com/content/dam/support/us/en/documents/mini-pcs/UEFI-Flash-BIOS-Update-Instructions.pdf)
 
-[^lenovoUpgrade]: [Lenovo flash BIOS with UEFI tool](https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/solutions/ht118103-flash-bios-with-uefi-tool-ideacentre-stick-300)
+[^lenovoUpgrade]: [Lenovo flash BIOS with UEFI tool](https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/solutions/ht118103-flash-bios-with-uefi-tool-ideacentre-stick-300)
 
-Grub and the kernels are not directly authorized by Microsoft, as it would
+Grub and the kernels are not directly authorized by Microsoft, as it would
 require for each and every single version to be signed individually by
 Microsoft. Instead, a binary called Shim[^shim] was developed. This rather
 small, auditable, innocuous-looking program is signed by Microsoft. Its role is
-basically that of a trojan horse. Indeed, its only purpose is to
+basically that of a trojan horse (or a security pivot, depending on the way you
-cryptographically verify the authenticity of any executable. However, this
+look at it). Indeed, its only purpose is to cryptographically verify the
-time, the list of public keys used to verify these executables is not directly
+authenticity of any executable. However, this time, the list of public keys
-under the control of Microsoft. These public keys are either built in Shim
+used to verify these executables is not directly under the control of
-itself or stored in a EFI variable serving as a database.
+Microsoft. These public keys are either built in Shim itself or stored in a EFI
+variable serving as a database.
 
-[^shim]: [shim source code](https://github.com/rhboot/shim)
+[^shim]: [shim source code](https://github.com/rhboot/shim)
 
 Additionally, shim public key list can be altered by any user able to prove
 "presence". This is the case of any user using the local console or using a BMC
@@ -134,17 +139,17 @@ the system believe that Secure Boot was used to bootstrap security, while
 untrusted code was ultimately run within the UEFI privileged mode.
 
 Hence, thanks to shim, just about any signed or unsigned, trusted or untrusted
-executable can be validated by proxy by Secure Boot using Microsoft keys. 
+executable can be validated by proxy by Secure Boot using Microsoft keys. 
 
 And this conclusion signs (pun intended) the second incoherence in ANSSI
 recommendations. Indeed, they recommend replacing Microsoft keys by our own set
 of keys only for highly secure security level (R4). This means that all systems
-with intermediate (2/4) and enhanced (3/4) security levels will have the false
+with intermediate (2/4) and enhanced (3/4) security levels will have the false
 sense of security of running Secure Boot while exposing themselves to attackers
 capable of proving "presence".
 
 For what it is worth, shim does provide a way secure all operations, including
-disabling verification or enrolling new keys by setting a password on shim's 
+disabling verification or enrolling new keys by setting a password on shim's 
 MOK (Machine Owner Keys) Manager[^mokpass]. However, the feature is mostly
 unused because no Linux distro enables it (it requires user interaction during
 the boot procedure) and system administrators often mistake the MOK Manager
@@ -153,10 +158,10 @@ password that is asked when running mokutil commands (including `--import` and
 `--disable-verification`), which is just a password used to confirm the will of
 the user in the MOK Manager. The author of this article failed to find a single
 tutorial or article discussing the necessity of setting a MOK Manager for a
-Secure Boot. ANSSI also failed to recommend that. Most interestingly, setting a
+Secure Boot. ANSSI also failed to recommend that. Most interestingly, setting a
-MOK Manager password is recommended even for Windows administrators that have
+MOK Manager password is recommended even for Windows administrators that have
 no intention of ever running Linux, because MOK Manager is one of
-the executables signed by the Microsoft keys.
+the executables signed by the Microsoft keys.
 
 [^mokpass]: The command is `mokutil --password`. Please consider using it.
 
@@ -164,7 +169,7 @@ the executables signed by the Microsoft keys.
 
 Since replacing the Microsoft keys and signing only authorized binaries (i.e.
 our own Unified Kernel Image and specifically not shim) is an option, why not
-do that? It just requires that the system administrators replace the Secure
+do that? It just requires that the system administrators replace the Secure
 Boot keys. The question of who controls the private key and the signature
 process is entirely up to whether the signed executable is altered or not by
 the system administrator. Distros could ship public keys and Unified Kernel
@@ -181,7 +186,7 @@ First, as mentioned earlier, the only thing that we verified is that the
 Unified Kernel Image is authentic. That kernel must then verify the operating
 system to ensure that only verified software is run. This requires
 cryptographic verification of every single executable (binaries, scripts and
-executable configuration files (because... yeah... that's a thing)) in the
+executable configuration files (because... yeah... that's a thing)) in the
 operating system. This can be achieved if we, at minimum, do the following:
 
 * use a read-only filesystem for our partitions containing executable code,
@@ -217,7 +222,7 @@ of physical access or remote access through a BMC, what is? Is there a better
 solution?
 
 Well, to the best of the author knowledge, there is one: using a TPM. Using a
-TPM will not necessarily prevent an attacker from tainting the firmware. It
+TPM will not necessarily prevent an attacker from tainting the firmware. It
 will not necessarily prevent booting untrusted and unverified executables. What
 a TPM can give us is the ability to unseal a LUKS passphrase and get access to
 user data if and only if the cryptographically verified right version of UEFI