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remove double space in secure boot post
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Florian Maury 2022-11-30 09:35:46 +01:00
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posts/secure_boot.md
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@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ of physical access or remote access through a BMC, what is? Is there a better
solution? solution?
Well, to the best of the author knowledge, there is one: using a TPM. Using a Well, to the best of the author knowledge, there is one: using a TPM. Using a
TPM will not necessarily  prevent an attacker from tainting the firmware. It TPM will not necessarily prevent an attacker from tainting the firmware. It
will not necessarily prevent booting untrusted and unverified executables. What will not necessarily prevent booting untrusted and unverified executables. What
a TPM can give us is the ability to unseal a LUKS passphrase and get access to a TPM can give us is the ability to unseal a LUKS passphrase and get access to
user data if and only if the cryptographically verified right version of UEFI user data if and only if the cryptographically verified right version of UEFI