2022-09-08 10:15:54 +00:00
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---
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title: "Building a Debian rootfs from an unprivileged user with deboostrap"
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slug: debootscrap
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authors: "Florian Maury"
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description: "Faking fakechroot to build a debian rootfs from an unprivileged account, using user namespaces"
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date: 2022-09-08T18:00:00+02:00
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type: posts
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draft: false
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layout: "singletoc"
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categories:
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- sysadmin
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tags:
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- debian
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- unprivileged
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- security
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lang: en
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---
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At Gatewatcher[^GW], we put efforts in making our building system reproducible
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and working offline, so that we can reduce the risk of supply chain attacks.
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Some efforts are also made so that our building system run with as few
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privileges as possible.
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[^GW]: https://www.gatewatcher.com/
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One of the few things we were still running as a privileged user recently was
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the build of our initial Debian root filesystem, for our base system and for our
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containers.
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Indeed, the official Debian Docker container from Docker Hub was not generated
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in a way that we can consider secure for our need. It basically downloads a blob
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from a web server, does no verification whatsoever of that blob and ships it as
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the root filesystem[^debdock]. Even though the root filesystem they are using
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can be rebuilt in a reproducible way, downloading the result from Internet
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without verifying it against the expected hash is sort of missing the point of
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reproducible builds. Also, debuerreotype uses debootstrap, which is problematic
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in itself, as explained hereafter.
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[^debdock]: https://github.com/debuerreotype/docker-debian-artifacts/blob/master/download.sh#L7
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To create such root filesystem, multiple tools are provided by the Debian team,
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among which `debootstrap`, and `multistrap`.
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Multistrap has not been updated in many years[^multistrap], and suffers from
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some limitations that were show-stoppers for us, but it is capable to create
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root filesystems from an unprivileged user without hacks.
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[^multistrap]: https://browse.dgit.debian.org/multistrap.git/log/
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On the other hand, deboostrap is not really friendly with the idea of building a
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system from an unprivileged user.
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First of, there is a check to ensure we are running it with UID 0[^checkUID].
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This can be bypassed in several documented ways, including using `fakeroot`,
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which overloads some libc calls, using `LD_PRELOAD`. An other, less hacky, way
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is to run the program in a user namespace.
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[^checkUID]: https://salsa.debian.org/installer-team/debootstrap/-/blob/bullseye/debootstrap#L586
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Unfortunately, this is not sufficient to run `debootstrap`, since it performs
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another check consisting of trying to create a "/dev/null" node[^checkNode].
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This is more problematic since nodes cannot be created from a user namespace, as
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this would create a easy way of escaping the namespace.
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[^checkNode]: https://salsa.debian.org/installer-team/debootstrap/-/blob/bullseye/functions#L1619
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As it seems, though, there is a way to build an unprivileged Debian root
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filesystem that is even built into deboostrap, using the installation variant
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2022-09-09 07:09:08 +00:00
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"fakechroot". Alternate code paths exist in deboostrap when this variant is
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selected that side-step some checks, and fake some calls. This variant also adds
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2022-09-08 10:15:54 +00:00
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a check to ensure this variant is run only if the `fakechroot` utility is in
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use. Therefore, you are expected to run debootstap as followed, as documented in
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the `fakechroot` manpage:
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```sh
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# apt update && apt install -y debootstrap fakeroot fakechroot
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$ fakechroot fakeroot debootstrap --variant=fakechroot bullseye $HOME/rootfs
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```
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`fakechroot` works by overloading some functions with `LD_PRELOAD`, and has some
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documented limitations regarding symlinks. As it happens, these limitations
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include rewrites of absolute symlinks, by prefixing them with the path of the
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faked chroot. As a result, within the chroot, you will find links that are
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broken when actually chrooting, such as when you would use that directory
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hierarchy as a root filesystem on a container or a virtual machine.
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With `fakechroot`:
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```sh
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$ readlink /path/to/my/chroot/usr/sbin/telinit
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/path/to/my/chroot/bin/systemctl
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```
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Without `fakechroot` (this is what you want to see, in a normal system):
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```sh
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$ readlink /path/to/my/chroot/usr/sbin/telinit
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/bin/systemctl
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```
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After some verifications, we decided that it was safe to fake the use of
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`fakechroot`, while using the "fakechroot" installation variant. For this, we
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set the environment variable `FAKECHROOT` to `true`, which fakechroot is
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supposed to set and which is controlled by debootstrap to authorize the use of
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the "fakechroot" variant. And it worked.
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So to build a working root filesystem from an unprivileged user, we are now
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doing the following:
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```sh
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$ podman unshare
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$ FAKECHROOT=true debootstrap --variant=fakechroot bullseye chroot/
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$ tar -C chroot/ --exclude=dev/* -czf ./chroot.tgz .
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$ exit
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$ cat <<EOF > Containerfile
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FROM scratch
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ADD chroot.tgz .
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CMD ["/bin/bash"]
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EOF
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$ podman build -f Containerfile
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```
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This series of commands builds a Debian container from an unprivileged user.
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More work needs to be done to achieve offline reproducible builds, of course,
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but none require hacks like this, thankfully.
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