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+---
+title: Why is it better to sign commits with SSH than OpenPGP?
+author: "Florian Maury" 
+slug: ssh-vs-openpgp-signing 
+date: 2022-05-26T11:00:00Z
+---
+
+The OpenPGP format was designed in the 90's and never really changed since
+then. It was documented in
+[RFC4880](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4880) in 2008.
+Unfortunately, in the 90's, people had really no good understanding of crypto
+yet, and the choices made were poor. Envelope design is poor. Some crypto
+algorithms are clearly outdated. Some default options are plain wrong.
+
+Have you ever noticed that so many crypto attacks target OpenPGP and GnuPG?
+That's not a surprise: it's a popular crypto solution and it's a relatively
+easy target, comparatively to some other mainstream crypto implementations. The
+Go langage maintainers even deprecated the OpenPGP implementation in their
+crypto standard library because they think [OpenPGP is
+*dangerous*](https://github.com/golang/go/issues/44226).
+
+> OpenPGP is incompatible with [Go Cryptography
+> Principles](https://golang.org/design/cryptography-principles),
+it's complex, fragile, and unsafe, and using it exposes applications to a
+dangerous ecosystem.
+
+Basically, I would say that the only thing that OpenPGP has for itself is the
+deployed infrastructure. Or has it? Web of trust is mostly dead, since
+keyservers are out-of-service. And OpenPGP adoption was never really that high
+to begin with.
+
+SSH keys are much more widely deployed and used than OpenPGP keys. The format
+is dead simple, and the crypto implementation from OpenSSH is up-to-date.
+
+I am very happy that git made SSH signing possible; it means I can delete my
+OpenPGP keys for good. I just hope linux distros will make the switch soon, to
+a more modern crypto approach: ssh signing or minisign.